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 In recent years, many countries have experienced a significant shift in population 
demographics towards increasingly older populations. Obviously, such changes will have 
important economic consequences. According to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke, the effects are particularly acute for the United States: 
“…over the past decade a combination of diverse forces has created a significant 
increase in the global supply of saving – a global saving glut – which helps to explain 
both the increase in the U.S. current account deficit and the relatively low level of long-
term interest rates in the world today. The prospect of dramatic increases in the ratio of 
retirees to workers in a number of major industrial economies is one important reason 
for the high level of global saving… a particularly interesting aspect of the global saving 
glut has been a remarkable reversal in the flows of credit to developing and emerging 
market economies, a shift that has transformed these economies from borrowers on 
international capital markets to large net lenders.” (Bernanke, 2005) 
 
As outlined by Bernanke, population aging is likely to have a substantial impact on 
economic activity across countries. Nevertheless, there has been relatively little work 
devoted towards understanding these critical issues. In an attempt to fill this gap, we 
study an important aspect of capital flows across countries: foreign direct investment 
(FDI). In doing so, we analytically derive changes in FDI with respect to aging, identify 
these patterns empirically using US FDI data, and then draw policy implications by 
examining how governments are likely to respond. In particular, we investigate the 
strategic taxation of the profits of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in light of the 
emerging demographic shifts.  
In the discussion on the economic impact of aging, three distinct yet interrelated 
issues emerge. First, economies with older populations (a higher proportion of old 
individuals relative to the current young) will have lower levels of savings. Since older 
individuals are near the end of the lifecycle, they save less than young people do. Due to 
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the higher amount of current consumption, the stock of savings may be lower.  Second, 
for a given population size, an older economy will have a smaller effective labor force. 
There are a number of reasons for this observation. Public pension programs in many 
countries explicitly encourage retirement by reducing benefits for those who continue 
working.1 In addition, older individuals may have a higher value of leisure time than the 
young.2 Finally, due to outdated skills and poorer health, older workers may be less 
productive than their younger counterparts, reducing the effective workforce. 
Consequently, for two economies with the same overall population size, the “older” 
economy would have a smaller workforce and a higher wage rate. Thus, aging influences 
the availability of factors and relative factor prices between countries, both of which alter 
international capital flows.3  
Third, as has recently received a great deal of attention, older populations create 
severe financial burdens for governments due to the bligations for funding old-age 
transfer programs such as public pensions and old-age health insurance.4 As an example, 
current projections for the United States indicate that social security payments will rise 
from 4.3% of GDP in 2004 to 6.4% in 2079 (SSA, 2005). 
                                                      
1 See Gruber and Wise (1999). Although many governments attempt to use public pension programs to 
improve the allocation of workers to jobs, Bhattachrya, Mulligan, and Reed (2004) demonstrate that they
generally provide inefficiently high retirement incentives. That is, they encourage too much retirement. 
2 For details, refer to Costa (1998), Parnes and Nestel (1981), Robinson et al. (1982), and Schulz (2001).  
3 The impact of relative factor prices on the level of FDI differs between the horizontal models of FDI (e.g. 
Markusen, 1984) and the vertical models (e.g. Helpman, 1984). In horizontal models, factor price 
differences discourage FDI whereas these differences encourage vertical FDI. When combined as in 
Markusen (2002), the net effect varies according to the degree of relative endowment differences as well as 
the relative size of countries. Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) find empirical evidence supporting 
Markusen’s (2002) approach. These differences provide us with another reason to separate the data in our 
empirical section along rich/poor and inbound/outbond lines.  
4 Profeta (2002) provides a cross-country comparison of the issues surrounding this fiscal burden. 
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All three of these aspects of population aging willcertainly affect factor supplies 
across countries. Naturally, they will also have a significant impact on the flow of capital 
between countries. Consequently, population demographics are likely to affect the 
strategic taxation of capital.5 It is also important to recognize that intergenerational 
transfer programs are almost exclusively “pay-as-you-g ” programs which are funded by 
payroll taxes. Obviously, the more severe the fiscal obligations of the government to fund 
old-age transfers, the greater the distortions it might impose upon workers in the labor 
market. In order to offset these distortions, the fiscal burden resulting from increasing 
population aging provides governments with additional i centives to restrict capital 
outflows. 
 In order to address these important issues, our paper has three principal objectives. 
First, we set up a simple model of FDI in order to analytically derive predictions 
regarding the impact of aging. Given our goal of analyzing strategic tax policy, we choose 
a model similar to that used by Bond and Samuelson (1989) to derive the Nash equilibria 
under tax competition between a home and host country. I  contrast to that group of 
models, we endogenize the supply of both labor and c pital in the home and host 
countries. In particular, we show how the domestic supply of each factor affects the 
                                                      
5 In our framework, we follow much of the tax competition literature by imposing that one country is the 
home country while the other is the host. As discused in Wilson (1999) and Gresik (2001), tax competition 
can also occur between potential host countries that offer tax breaks in order to at ract capital inflows. It can 
be argued that population aging can have an important impact in this manner. Although we do not consider 
such issues, the effect of population demographics would be ambiguous. As a potential host becomes older, 
the effective labor supply and domestic capital stock will fall. While the decline in labor supply hinders its 
ability to attract capital inflows, the resulting lower amount of savings would cause the return to capital to 
rise. Thus, the net impact of aging on a country’s need to offer tax incentives depends on the relative 
magnitude of these effects. However, the nature of the competition – lowering taxes to increase the 
attractiveness of a location – would likely remain much the same. Furthermore, as our results in Section 4 
show, the desirability of inbound FDI would likely increase as a country ages as this aids its struggle to 
provide intergenerational transfers.  
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amount of capital flows. Moreover, we demonstrate the effects of population aging on 
factor prices and FDI. Second, we empirically document the role of demographics for 
FDI. Interestingly, our estimates conform quite closely to the predictions of our theory, 
especially for FDI between the US and developed countries. 
 Finally, given the empirical support for our benchmark model, we extend our 
analysis to study how governments are likely to design international tax policy in light of 
aging demographic profiles.6 This is especially significant since we incorporate that 
intergenerational transfer programs are funded by payroll taxes. Due to the severe 
financial burden imposed upon the working population, labor effort will be further 
distorted in older economies. One method of minimizing this distortion for capital-
exporting governments is to restrict capital outflows. This occurs for two reasons. First, 
doing so exploits their market power in international capital markets and increasing 
earnings from capital. As a result, the elderly obtain higher amounts of consumption. 
Second, restricting capital outflows boosts domestic labor productivity, increasing the tax 
base that can be used for pay-as-you-go pension programs. This second effect is new to 
the literature and provides even small capital exporters with an incentive to tax FDI. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our benchmark 
model in which we examine the effects of aging on employment, the domestic stock of 
capital and labor in each country, and the amount of FDI. Compared to the multi-country, 
overlapping generations models of Boersh-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2001) or Brooks 
                                                      
6In our framework, we assume that FDI is driven by factor price differences across countries. Admittedly, 
we do not address how population aging affects the motivations for FDI, i.e. whether it affects the mix of 
horizontal versus vertical FDI. Although a detailed model of the multinational firm would shed some 
additional insight into the effects of aging demographics, the surveys of Markusen (2002) and Feenstra 
(2004) illustrate that such complexity would render ou  analysis to be intractable. Furthermore, it would not 
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(2003), our model is more simplistic.7 However, this minimalism comes with the benefit 
of tractability, allowing us to analytically derive optimal tax policies rather than relying 
on simulated comparisons of various policy regimes. It i  worth noting that in either case, 
the simulated effects of demographic changes on capital flows in their papers mirror the 
derived results of these changes on FDI in ours. We find three main results that 
correspond to the three aspects of aging discussed above. First, an increase in the age of 
an economy increases the cost of capital, driving up its rate of return in that country. 
Since FDI arises to exploit international differencs in the return to capital across 
countries, an aging home country will tend to drive down capital outflows whereas an 
aging host country will stimulate capital exports from home.  
 Second, in contrast to the financial market effects of population aging, the labor 
market implications differ significantly. As discussed above, an older economy will have 
a smaller effective labor force. This aspect of aging in the home country lowers the return 
to capital. Thus, in contrast to the capital market effect of aging, FDI outflows will 
increase. Similarly, if the host economy is older, capital inflows to the host country will 
fall. Third, when pension payments require higher social security tax burdens this again 
reduces the available labor supply, creating comparable results to a reduction in the 
effective labor force. Thus, our results suggest that t e overall impact of population aging 
on FDI – irrespective of the need for intergenerational transfers – will be ambiguous. The 
net impact of population aging depends on the quantitative significance of the labor 
market and financial market channels.  
                                                                                                                                                              
be possible to derive conclusions regarding the effcts of aging on tax competition. Consequently, we leave 
construction of a formal, firm-based trade model of FDI and population aging for future research. 
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Therefore, we proceed in Section 3 by conducting a statistical analysis of 
population aging and foreign direct investment between countries. Although our theoretic 
treatment of FDI yields results that would apply to international capital flows in general, 
we restrict ourselves to FDI in the empirical section to differentiate ourselves from the 
existing literature by illustrating the impact of aging through a particular component of 
capital flows. Furthermore, this allows us to draw better connections between our results 
and both the empirical work on FDI as well as the tax competition literature. Employing 
the modified knowledge-capital specification of Blonigen and Davies (2004), we examine 
the impact of various aspects of population aging o FDI flows. Utilizing data on US 
inbound and outbound FDI, we find, in particular for FDI with developed countries, 
empirical support for the three different aspects of aging that we conjecture.  
Since the data appear to confirm the predictions of our framework, Section 4 turns 
to the final goal of our paper – the study of how governments are likely to design 
international tax policy in light of observed demographic trends in different countries. As 
emphasized above, higher dependency ratios place a significant financial burden on 
younger workers since payroll taxes are used for funding old-age government transfer 
programs. Therefore, in contrast to previous research on tax competition and foreign 
direct investment, we study a constrained maximization problem in which old-age 
transfers must be in part financed by labor taxes.   
 In the class of tax competition models such as Bond and Samuelson (1989), 
Janeba (1995) and Davies and Gresik (2003), most papers ssume that governments tax 
capital flows in order to maximize national income. However, we incorporate the 
                                                                                                                                                              
7 Helliwell (2004) provides a recent overview of this literature using computable general equilibrium 
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constraint that old-age transfers are partly funded by payroll taxes. Therefore, the older an 
economy, the greater the equilibrium labor market distortions imposed upon the working 
population. Since labor taxes reduce the private return to labor, higher taxes lead to less 
employment and more capital flight. As a result, the home government has significant 
reasons for restricting capital outflows. Obviously, the market power effects in Bond and 
Samuelson (1989) and Janeba (1995) occur. However, there are two additional channels 
present in our model due to the endogenous supply of lab r and the effects of population 
aging.8 First, for a given labor tax, capital exports exaggerate distortions in the labor 
market relative to a fixed capital allocation. Second, as capital outflows reduce the 
marginal productivity of labor in the home country, home wages fall. The smaller tax 
base forces the home government to increase the tax rate in order to satisfy financial 
obligations for old-age transfers. This exacerbates th  distortions in the labor market. 
Consequently, aging increases the desire to tax capital outflows, leading to an increase in 
tax competition. 
 
2. The Benchmark Model of Endogenous Factor Supplies in Each Country 
 We explore the implications of population aging in a simple model of FDI. There 
are two countries which we refer to as the home country and the host. In addition, there 
are two types of agents: individuals (workers) and e trepreneurs. In order to consider the 
effects of population aging on capital flows across countries, we study a setting in which 
                                                                                                                                                              
models to study population aging and international factor movements. 
8 If preferences are homothetic and non-distortionary t xes are available, national income maximization 
would be isomorphic to a problem with provision of a public good such as intergenerational transfers. 
However, we do not allow for these features since social security programs are funded by distortionary 
labor taxes. 
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individual agents differ according to their position along the lifecycle. For simplicity, we 
refer to these individuals as “young” and “old.” In our benchmark model, individuals 
elastically supply labor and capital. In contrast, entrepreneurs are endowed with a 
production technology but do not have a time endowment for labor.   
 The total population size of each country is given by N and N*.9 In order to 
account for differences in the relative numbers of young and old across countries, we 
define an economy’s dependency ratio as the number of old individuals divided by the 
size of the population of young. However, in our analysis below, it is convenient to 
assume that the population mass of the young is equal to one in each country. Therefore, 
any differences in dependency ratios (β) across countries are the result of differences in 
the population size of the old allowing us to refer to an increase in the dependency ratio 
as an increase in the age of a country. Consistent with the literature, labor is immobile 
across countries.  
In each country, labor (L) and capital (K) are combined to produce a homogeneous 
consumption good with a constant price normalized to one.10  Both factor and product 
markets are perfectly competitive. Since labor is immobile across countries, the 
productivity of each factor is dependent upon the location in which it is utilized. The 
home production function is represented by ( , )F K L and production in the foreign country 
is given by * * *( , )F K L . Although labor is immobile, capital can costlessly flow across 
borders. We denote the flow of capital from the home to the host country as Z. By 
definition of the two countries, Z is non-negative. In this manner, the productivity of 
                                                      
9 Host variables are denoted by *.  
10 Thus, both home and host are small in international goods markets. This assumption is standard in models 
of tax competition between home and host countries. 
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capital which originates in the home country but is used in the host depends on the 
foreign production technology. Finally, the production function in each country exhibits 
constant returns to scale and is strictly concave in each factor.  
 In contrast to standard models of tax competition for FDI, we consider that the 
supply of capital in each country is elastic. Moreov r, we examine how the amount of 
capital supplied in each country depends on population demographics. One method of 
approaching the issue of population dynamics would be to specify an intertemporal utility 
maximization problem and solve for the relevant savings and consumption decisions. 
However, as noted by Higgins (1998) and Higgins and Williams (1996), this more 
detailed approach comes at the cost of intractabiliy.11 Since our goal is to analyze 
equilibria in a tax setting game that itself will have discontinuities in best-responses, it is 
necessary for us to sacrifice a detailed description of the consumer’s utility maximization 
problem. In its place, we impose reduced form cost functions that reflect the main results 
that would arise from such a model. To this end, we posit a cost of capital function for 
each country given by ( ; )C K β  and * * *( ; )C K β .12  Intuitively, the function C measures the 
aggregate utility loss from foregoing K units of initial consumption in units of final output 
produced by firms. Moreover, assuming that β and β* represent the population mass of 
old individuals in each country, we contend that it is more difficult for an economy to 
                                                      
11 In essence, aging dynamics eliminate steady states since otherwise the percentage of old in the economy 
converges to one in the limit, eliminating production. 
12 As an example, in dynamic models of FDI, new investments may be financed through retained earnings. 
Furthermore, as discussed by Hartman (1985) and Sinn (1993), there is an incentive for firms to underinvest 
and expand through retained earnings. Furthermore, under credits, firms have the ability to allocate excess 
credits across periods. Accounting for these featurs of FDI makes an analysis of the strategic interac ions 
from international tax competition to be much less tractable and we therefore pursue our analysis in a static 
setting. An additional benefit of this approach is that it aids in comparing our results to those of static 
models such as Bond and Samuelson (1989).  
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attain a particular level of capital accumulation if the economy has a higher value of β.13 
We assume that the cost function is increasing and strictly convex in the capital stock of 
each country as the utility loss from providing additional capital to factor markets and 
sacrificing current consumption is increasing with the amount of capital supplied.14  
 As for the returns to capital across countries, we assume that in the absence of 
FDI that the home and host capital markets are segmented. In our discussion below, this 
implies that capital will flow across countries until the after-tax returns are the same in 
both the home and host countries.15 Although we derive expressions for the endogenous 
stock of capital in each country below, we begin our analysis by studying a representative 
entrepreneur/firm in each country who chooses the amount of capital and labor to use in 
order to maximize profits.  
Comparable to our assumptions on capital, our approach towards labor supply is 
geared towards a high degree of tractability. Rather than solving an explicitly dynamic 
model of intertemporal consumption choice and labor supply, we posit a cost of 
employment function for each country given by ( ; )E L d  and * * *( ; )E L d  where akin to β a 
higher d is associated with a higher age.16 We use separate notation for these two in order 
to more easily separate the effect of aging on FDI through the capital market and labor 
                                                      
13 Although we consider a static model, we view our analysis as representative of an explicit dynamic 
framework in which the young make consumption and savings decisions to maximize their lifetime utility. 
14 A long-standing literature finds a negative correlation between an economy's dependency ratio and its 
national savings (which implies a higher cost of capital). A handful of examples include Houthakker (1965), 
Modigliani and Sterling (1983), Horioka (1989), and Weil (1994). 
15 With no uncertainty regarding firm costs or revenus and no cost to enforcement, there is no role for 
transfer pricing. 
16 The primary advantage of using a model like those of Boersh-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2001) or 
Brooks (2003) with explicit population dynamics and savings decisions is that these would pin down the 
relationship between our variables d and β. However, the disadvantage is that this relationship is contingent 
on the functional forms chosen. One of the contribuions of this paper is to show that the impact of aging 
found in those papers is similar to those found in this alternative, more general framework.   
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market channels.17 In this manner, E represents the lost value of leisure time (measured in 
units of final output) in the economy when total employment is L. As is common, we 
assume that these functions are increasing, convex functions of labor. Moreover, we view 
that the lost value of leisure in the economy is increasing in the economy’s dependency 
ratio.18 For example, the opportunity cost of working for older individuals is likely to be 
higher due to their lower level of health. In addition, old individuals may simply have a 
higher value for leisure time than their younger counterparts in the labor market.19 
Furthermore, we assume that the home (host) country levies a tax rate of η (η*) on labor 
income, a tax which is paid by the worker. This formulation for funding a pay-as-you-go 
social security system is the same as that used in Schieber and Shoven's (1996) cross-
country comparison of such programs. 
Factor Market Equilibria 
 Since factor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, firms and workers 
take the prices of labor and capital as given in each market. We denote the gross return to 
capital in the home country as r and let r* be the gross return in the host. In addition, the 
gross return to labor in each market is given by w and w*.  Entrepreneurs in each country 
choose the amount of capital and labor to utilize in order to maximize profits: 
 *( , ) (1 )F K Z L r Z wL rKπ τ= − + − − −  (1) 
                                                      
17 In addition, by recognizing these separate effects of aging, it provides additional testable hypotheses for 
our empirical analysis. 
18Public pension programs in many countries either explicitly or implicitly tax elderly work in order to 
discourage their participation in the labor market. In this manner, choosing to work implies a loss of 
pension benefits.  Although we do not explicitly model how age-related government transfer programs 
impact labor supply across the lifecycle, we consider the effects of transfers on labor taxes in Section 4.  
19 Alternatively, this function could just as easily reflect a higher cost of achieving an effective amount of 
labor productivity from elderly workers due to poorer health, outdated training, and so forth. It is important 
to note that in this way, we assume that, at some point age becomes such a detriment to productivity that it 
dominates any learning by doing aspects of labor prductivity.  
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where Z is the level of FDI and τ is the relative effective tax rate on foreign-earned 
profits.20 The exact form of τ is dependent on the home and host statutory tax raes as 
well as the double tax relief method used by home. Since our goal at the moment is to 
derive how investment decisions depend on aging and relative effective taxes, we defer 
discussion on the details of the relative effective rat  to Section 4 where we discuss 
optimal taxation. The profit-maximizing conditions for home labor and capital 
employment are given by: 
 ( , )Lw F K Z L= −  (2) 
 *( , ) (1 )Kr F K Z L rτ= − = − . (3) 
In the host country, the profit function of the repr sentative entrepreneur is: 
 * * * * * * * *( , )F K Z L w L r Kπ = + − −  (4) 
The profit-maximizing conditions for labor and capit l employment in the host are: 
 * * * *( , )Lw F K Z L= +  (5) 
and 
 * * * *( , )Kr F K Z L= + . (6) 
 In order for an individual to be willing to supply an additional unit of capital to 
firms in the home (host) country, individuals must receive the marginal cost of doing so. 
Similarly, for an individual to supply a unit of labor, they must receive an after-labor tax 
                                                      
20 One advantage of our one-shot formulation of the model is that it allows us to avoid the complex dynamic 
profit maximization problem of a MNE that can repatriate or reinvest earnings. As shown by Hartman 
(1985) and Sinn (1993), incorporating these aspects into the model would be difficult. Furthermore, since in 
those models the multinational does not repatriate profits until it is mature (choosing instead to reinvest 
overseas earnings in the interim due to repatriation taxes), the transitional dynamics would make the model 
extremely opaque. Thus, it is perhaps best to think of our model as describing the response of mature MNEs 
to aging, an interpretation in line with the model's better fit to data between the US and other developed 
countries. 
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amount equal to the cost of providing labor. Thus, the capital supply conditions in each 
country satisfy: 
 ( , )Kr C K β=  (7) 
and 
 * * * *( , )Kr C K β=  (8) 
while the labor supply conditions in each country are given by: 
 ( , )Lw E L d=  (9) 
and 
 * * * *( , )Lw E L d= . (10) 
Combining (2), (3), and (5) through (10) yields five factor market equilibrium equations.  
 ( , ) ( , )K KF K Z L C K β− =  (11) 
 * * *( , ) (1 ) ( , )K KF K Z L F K Z Lτ− = − +  (12) 
 * * * * * *( , ) ( , )K KF K Z L C K β+ = . (13) 
 (1 ) ( , ) ( , )L LF K Z L E L dη− − =  (14) 
and 
 * * * * * * *(1 ) ( , ) ( , )L LF K Z L E L dη− + = . (15) 
From these equilibrium conditions, we may examine the impact of aging and government 
policies on international capital flows from the home to the host. This impact of aging 
through its effect on the cost of raising capital is summarized in our first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1.  (Impact of Aging on FDI through the Cost of Capitl)  An increase in 
home’s dependency ratio (β), decreases FDI through the cost of capital. An increase in 
host’s dependency ratio (β*) increases FDI through the cost of capital. 
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Proof: For notational convenience, it is useful to define th  following three variables: 
 ( )(1 ) 0KK LL KK LL LLf E C f Eη∆ = + − − < , 
 ( )* * * * * * *(1 ) 0KK LL KK LL LLf E C f Eη∆ = + − − < , 
and 
 * * * *(1 ) 0KK KK LL KK KK LLC f E C f EτΩ = − ∆ − − ∆ < . 
For given tax rates, totally differentiating (11) through (15) allows us to calculate the 
following comparative statics: 




−= Ω ∆ <  (16) 
and 
 1 * * *
*






−= −Ω − ∆ > . (17) 
Q.E.D. 
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. When a country’s dependency ratio 
(β or β*) rises, its supply of capital falls.21 For given FDI flows, this increases the rate of 
return on capital in that country. FDI responds by shifting capital to the high return 
location. Thus, if home’s age rises, FDI falls as cpital returns home, while if host’s age 
rises, FDI increases. This mirrors the results from studies of the current account by 
Higgins and Williamson (1996), Cutler et. al. (1990), and others who derive such savings 
effects from dynamic models of savings (and typically rely on computational examples to 
reach their results) 
                                                      
21 The explicit presentation of the comparative statics for the capital and labor supplies are omitted for 
space. These are available upon request. 
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This effect, however, is only one aspect of the impact of aging on FDI since aging 
not only raises the cost of capital, but also increases the cost of labor. Since a key 
difference between FDI and financial flows is the productive nature of FDI, this is 
particularly important here. This effect of aging on FDI is discussed in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2.  (Impact of Aging on FDI through the Cost of Labor)  An increase in 
home’s dependency ratio (d) increases FDI through the cost of labor. An increase in 
host’s dependency ratio (d*) decreases FDI through the cost of labor. 
 
Proof: Again, for given tax rates, totally differentiating (11) through (15) allows us to 
calculate the following comparative statics: 




−= Ω ∆ >  (18) 
and 
 1 * * *
*




τ−= −Ω − ∆ < . (19) 
Q.E.D. 
Here too, the intuition is straightforward. As the marginal cost of labor rises due 
to an increase in the dependency ratio, the supply of labor falls.22 Since the marginal rate 
of return on capital is rising in a country’s labor supply, as a country ages, the rate of 
return to capital falls. Again FDI responds by shifting capital towards the higher rate of 
return. Thus, if d rises, FDI rises as well whereas if d* rises, FDI falls. 
                                                      
22 The comparative statics for d and d* on K, K*, L, and L* are available upon request. 
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 Using these factor market equilibrium conditions, we can also establish the impact 
of capital and labor taxes on FDI and factor supplies. These results are contained in 
Propositions 3, 4, and 5. 
 
Proposition 3: (Impact of the Relative Effective Tax Rate) An increase in the relative 
effective tax rate (τ) decreases FDI, the home capital supply, and the host labor supply. 
An increase in the relative effective tax rate increases the host capital supply and the 
home labor supply.  
 
Proof: Totally differentiating (11) through (15) yields the following comparative statics: 




−= Ω ∆∆ < , (20) 




−= Ω ∆ < , (21) 
 
*






−− Ω − ∆ < , (22) 
 
*




−= −Ω ∆ > , (23) 
and 











Proposition 4: (Impact of Home’s Labor Tax) An increase in home’s labor tax (η) 
increases FDI and the host labor supply. An increase in home’s labor tax decreases 
home’s labor supply and both the home and host capital supplies. 
 
Proof: Totally differentiating (11) through (15) yields the following comparative statics: 




−= Ω ∆ > , (25) 
 
*
1 * * *(1 ) 0L KK KL KL KK
dL




−= −Ω − > , (26) 
 1 * * * *(1 ) ( ) 0L KK KK LL KK KK KK KK
dL




−  = −Ω − − − ∆ <  , (27) 
 1 * * *(1 ) 0L KK KK LL KL
dK








1 * * 0L KK KL LL KK
dK
f f f E C
dη
−= −Ω < . (29) 
           Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 5: (Impact of Host’s Labor Tax) An increase in host’s labor tax (η*) 
decreases FDI, the host labor supply, and the capital supplies of both countries. An 
increase in host’s labor tax increases home’s labor supply. 
 
Proof: Totally differentiating (11) through (15) yields the following comparative statics: 
 1 * * *
*






−= −Ω − ∆ <  (30) 
 
*
1 * * * * *
*
( ) (1 ) 0L KK KK LL KK KK KK KK
dL




−  = −Ω − − − ∆ <  , (31) 
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 1 * * *
*
(1 )(1 ) 0L KL KL KK KK
dL




−= −Ω − − > , (32) 
 1 * *
*
0L KK KL KK LL
dK
f f f C E
dη




1 * * *
*
(1 ) 0L KK KL LL KK
dK




−= −Ω − < . (34) 
Q.E.D. 
Here too the intuition is straightforward. An increas  in the relative effective tax reduces 
the after tax rate of return from FDI relative to dmestic investment. As a result, FDI 
falls. This returning capital crowds out some domestic capital, but not totally, thereby 
increasing total capital usage at home. This raises th  marginal productivity of home 
labor, increasing the wage and increasing its supply. In the host, as capital flows out, the 
rate of return to capital rises there, increasing the host supply of capital. Host capital does 
not increase by the same amount that FDI decreases, however, thereby lowering the host 
wage and the host supply of labor. 
 When a country’s labor tax rises, its domestic labor supply falls. This effect is 
observed empirically by Gruber and Wise (1998), who als  provide a review of numerous 
country studies documenting this relationship betwen social security taxes and labor 
supply.23 This lowers the return to capital in that country relative to the other and FDI 
responds accordingly. Floden's (2003) dynamic model f capital flows yields a 
comparable result in simulations. It is worth noting that Ehrlich and Zhong (1998) find 
                                                      
23 Alternatively, as posed by Pellechio (1979), higher taxes could imply higher benefits, lowering the 
opportunity cost of retirement and reducing work effort by the elderly. In our model, this would be a 
comparable effect to that of η and, if we impose a balanced budget on the governmnt, there is a clear link 
between the two. 
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that increases in the labor tax also decreases human capital accumulation.24 Given the 
importance of skilled labor to MNEs found in most empirical studies of FDI, this would 
suggest an additional reason for FDI to avoid locati ns with high labor taxes.  Although 
we do not speak directly towards this in our presentation, we can certainly account for it 
by simply reinterpreting a country's labor stock as its effective human capital stock 
(which depends on both the number of workers and their skill level). When the world 
labor supply falls, so too does the world’s supply of capital (since the capital supply of 
each country falls). Finally, in the country that cpital shifts towards, its net change in 
capital is positive, increasing the productivity of its labor and therefore its labor supply. 
Since capital is attracted to large labor pools, in our model, FDI will be largest 
when the host working-age population is large relative to that of home. Since FDI 
responds to labor supplies, which is reflected in the wage rate, this would suggest that 
FDI will be largest when, ceteris paribus, the host wage is much less than the home wage.   
As such, FDI more closely resembles that of Helpman’s (1984) vertical model. It should 
be noted, however, that under our assumptions of constant returns to scale, exogenous 
prices, and no trade costs, that horizontal FDI should not be expected to emerge 
(Markusen, 1984). Evidence of vertical FDI is found by Feinberg and Keene (2001), 
Yeaple (2003), Walkirch (2003) and Hanson, Mataloni, a d Slaughter (forthcoming) 
among others. 
 Thus, the net impact of aging on FDI is ambiguous in our model. As the home 
country ages, increases in the cost of raising capital reduces FDI whereas decreases in the 
labor supply, due to both aging and higher labor taxes to pay for benefits, increases FDI. 
                                                      
24 This study builds off of the family growth model of Ehrlich and Lui (1998). 
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As the host ages, capital there becomes more scarce, incr asing FDI. At the same time, 
host labor falls due to aging and higher labor taxes, d creasing FDI. Therefore, the impact 
of aging on FDI depends on the relative importance of these channels both within and 
across countries. Before proceeding to optimal taxation of FDI, in the next section we 
present some empirical analysis that suggests, in particular for US FDI with the other 
developed countries, the above predictions on the impact of aging on FDI hold true. 
 
3. Empirical Effects of Population Aging on Foreign Direct Investment 
 In this section, our goal is to present empirical results estimating the response of 
FDI to the three aspects of aging identified above. W  do this in order to frame our 
discussion on optimal taxation in Section 4.  
3.1 Empirical Specification and Data 
 Our theoretical model in the previous section demonstrated the effects of aging 
when FDI results from differences in the return on capital (which is positively related to 
the supply of labor). In this manner, our benchmark model captures “vertical” motivations 
for FDI as introduced by Helpman (1984) in which FDI occurs due to factor price 
differences. Beyond vertical FDI, there is also the market-access driven, “horizontal” 
model of the multinational firm. Developed by Markusen (1984), this model is one in 
which a firm exploits economies of scale and avoids trade costs by producing the same 
good in multiple locations. Notably, the horizontal model generates incentives for firms 
to produce in larger countries in order to avoid trade costs associated with servicing that 
market. 
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 More recently, these motivations have been integrad in the knowledge capital 
model developed by Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Markusen (2002), which 
asserts that both horizontal and vertical aspects are important. Here, the impact of factor 
differences is ambiguous since these increase vertical FDI but create disadvantages for 
horizontal MNEs. This is further complicated by scale effects since skill differences are 
less important if the host country is relatively small. 
 As the existing theory produces somewhat conflicting insights regarding the 
determinants of FDI, our empirical specification attempts to avoid mis-specification bias 
by allowing for both to be observed in the data. To be specific, our regression analysis 
builds off of the so-called “gravity” model which has been widely used in the empirical 
literature on FDI.25 In this manner, our baseline specification for FDI from a home 
country i to a host country j in year t is given by: 
 0 1 2 3 4 5ijt it jt ijt it jt ijtFDI GRAVITY GRAVITY X AGE AGEξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ε= + + + + + + . (35) 
 We follow many papers by using the real value of sale  by affiliates from country 
i operating in country j in year t as a proxy for the amount of FDI from i to j. Our data set 
covers US inbound and outbound FDI from 1983-1998 for 55 countries.26 We obtained 
the real value of sales from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and converted it into real 
1996 dollars using the chain-type price index for gross domestic investment from the 
Economic Report of the President.27 Although our theoretical model examines FDI flows 
from i to j, we use sales because this measure of activity helps to control for variation in 
                                                      
25 See Eaton and Tamura (1994), Brainard (1997), and Blonigen and Davies (2004) for examples. 
26 Poterba (1998) uses US data to study the effect of aging on asset prices. Although he does not consider 
the effect of aging on capital flows, he points to this as one potential area in which aging will have 
important effects. 
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technology and other differences in affiliates that are unobservable. Thus, our measure 
represents the current value of FDI activity in the host.28, 29 Our objective was to obtain 
data for a broad spectrum of countries. However, th search for a richer cross-section 
limited the time-series dimension of our analysis. Thus, although our data only spans 
sixteen years, it represents information for a large number of countries.30 
As a benchmark for determining how aging affects the flow of capital between 
countries, we begin by discussing the different variables which are standard in the FDI 
literature. The GRAVITY terms are vectors that contr l for various standard 
characteristics of the home and host countries. For both the home and host we include log 
real GDP (GDP), log real per capita GDP (SKILL), log investment as a share of GDP 
(INVEST), and a proxy for trade costs (TCOST). The proxy for skill is the same as that 
used by Slaughter (2000).31 
                                                                                                                                                              
27 The BEA’s FDI data can be found at http://www.bea.doc gov/bea/di/di1usdbal.htm.  The price deflator 
can be found at  http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/sheets/b7.xls. 
28 Note that affiliate sales are total affiliate sale, not just those in the local market. Given the assumptions 
of zero trade costs and exogenous output prices in our model, this measure of sales comes closest to tha  in 
the theory. 
29 An alternative to using affiliate sales would be th stock of FDI. The advantage of the stock data is that 
these data start earlier than do the sales data, especially for US outbound FDI to the developed countries. 
However, as discussed by Blonigen and Davies (2004) there are issues with the time series properties of the 
stock measure as well as using historical-cost based measures of FDI. In addition, the available time series 
of our aging variables limited the usefulness of these earlier stock observations. Nevertheless, we find very 
similar estimates for the aging variables when using the real stock of FDI as our measure of FDI activity. 
These alternative regressions are available upon request. 
30 An alternative dataset would be to use data on outbound FDI from OECD countries, data which are 
available from the OECD’s International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook. The advantage of these 
data is that they do not always have the U.S. as one of the two countries in an observation. There are, 
however, two disadvantages. First, the definition of FDI and the collection of the data differ across source 
countries, leading to potential compatibility problems. Second, they are available for a far narrower set of 
countries. In particular, this latter problem led us to use the U.S. data a choice that also eases the 
comparison of our results to existing results. 
31 Although other measures of skill are available, thy limit the countries that we could include in our 
sample. Nevertheless, when these alternates were usd, comparable results were found. 
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Our measure of trade costs is 1(1 )OPENNESS+  where OPENNESS is the sum of 
a country's imports plus exports over its GDP. All of these were obtained from Penn 
World Tables, Version 6.1 (PWT 6.1) 32.  In addition, for the host, we include a measure 
of investment costs (ICOSTS). This is measured as the log of one over one plus the BERI 
index which is a composite of operations risk index, political risk index and remittance 
and repatriation factor index.  These indices are developed by Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence S.A.33  
 In addition, Xijt controls for other factors that potentially influenc  FDI between 
the US and another country. The first of these, DISTANCE, is common in gravity model 
specifications. We measure this as the log of the distance between capital cities measured 
in kilometers.34 The second is a dummy variable RICH that is equal to one for the 
developed countries. The third is a trend term. We also include each country's investment 
rate (INVEST) to control for the overall investment conditions in the country in addition 
to those related to aging. This is measured by investm nt as a percentage of GDP and 
comes from the Penn-World Tables. To control for overall macroeconomic conditions, 
we include FX, the log of the bilateral exchange rat with the US obtained from the Penn-
World Tables. Finally, in some specifications, as we discuss further below, we also 
include fixed effects.  
                                                      
32 The PWT data is available online at ht p://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php and are described 
by Summers and Heston (1991). 
33 For more information see http://www.beri.com.   
34 This was gathered from the distance calculator at http://www.indo.com. 
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 We now turn to the principal variables of interest, AGEit and AGEjt, vectors that 
contain variables representing aspects of aging for the home and host countries.35 We 
include three separate terms in each. The first of these is DEPENDENCY which is the log 
of the ratio of the population 65 and over relative o the population 15 to 64. This is 
equivalent to the d term in our theory. The second aging variable is NATLSAVINGS, 
which is the log of a country's gross national savings as a percentage of its GDP. This is 
equivalent to the opposite of the β term in our model since older (higher β) countries 
would have lower savings rates. The third aging variable is SS, which is the log of the 
percentage of GDP collected in social security taxes. This represents the effect of η in the 
previous section. All of these variables come from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators (2004).  
 Finally, εijt is a standard i.i.d. error term. Summary statistics for all of our 
variables are found in the data appendix. The appendix also includes the list of countries 
used in the data set, as well as a list of those deignated as developed countries.  
 Before proceeding to the discussion of our results, we offer some comments 
regarding how our specification contrasts with the existing empirical literature. Although 
Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) conduct their analysis by studying the various data in 
levels, Blonigen and Davies (2004) find that this often leads to estimated coefficients 
with implausible magnitudes. This occurs because of the skewed nature of FDI data 
across countries. The skewness is easily observed by reviewing the summary statistics in 
                                                      
35 Higgins (1998) considers the impact of aging on the current account (which includes net financial flows 
and net FDI). He finds the effects of aging on investment differ from savings. On the basis of his analysis, 
Higgins predicts that aging developing countries should observe higher current account balances. However, 
he does not explicitly focus on the determination of FDI activity. Consequently, he does not include many 
of the standard gravity variables in his specification potentially biasing his estimates.  
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the data appendix – the mean for affiliate sales is two-thirds as large as its maximum 
value. We therefore use logs of our variables rathe than levels to offset the problem. In 
some specifications, we also separate the data into two different subsamples: U.S. FDI 
with rich and poor countries. This further alleviates the skewness problem. 
 As mentioned above, our empirical specification attempts to avoid mis-
specification problems by allowing for both vertical and horizontal motives for FDI to be 
observed in the data. Notably, the knowledge capital model highlights the importance of 
relative factor endowments between countries. According to Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 
(2001), greater skill differences between two countries should be associated with larger 
factor price differentials and more FDI. As discussed by Blonigen, Davies, and Head 
(2003), however, this applies only to the vertical aspect of FDI with an opposite 
relationship between skill differences and horizontal FDI. As a result, estimation based 
upon skill differences can be sensitive to whether  variable is positive or negative. 
Moreover, there are difficulties in using negatives b cause of our log-linear specification.  
 Therefore, we choose to include the log-levels of kill for both home and host 
countries rather than their differences. For a fixed level of skill in the home country, an 
increase in labor productivity in the host country should be associated with a higher 
amount of FDI activity. Analogously, we should find an increase in skill in the home 
country would be associated with less FDI. 
 However, according to the knowledge capital model, ski l differences are less 
relevant if the host country is small. In order to capture these aspects, the model requires 
complex interactions since the effect of relative endowments is non-linear. Note that in 
our data, US per capita income is almost always the highest. Thus, as in Blonigen, 
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Davies, and Head (2003), for some specifications we choose to separate the data into two 
subsamples: one in which the home country is relatively skill abundant and another in 
which the host is. In the data in our sample, this amounts to using inbound and outbound 
FDI separately, where US inbound FDI is the skill-abundant home subset and US 
outbound FDI makes up the skill-abundant host subset.  
 3.2 Results 
 Table 1 presents our baseline estimates where, in addition to the standard gravity 
model variables, we include the dependency ratio of the home and host countries. As for 
the standard determinants of FDI, the gravity controls have their commonly found signs 
and are frequently statistically significant. Thus, our results suggest that FDI is higher 
between large, wealthy economies with low trade barriers. In addition, FDI is lower when 
the host country has higher investment costs. Moreover, distance is negatively correlated 
with sales of affiliates.  
 We turn to the principal variables of interest, the effects of population aging. In 
particular, we are interested in determining the ext nt to which our empirical results are 
consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model in Section 2. Notably, our model 
suggests that the financial market effects of aging will differ from their labor market 
effects. Since our model does not tell us which effect is likely to be quantitatively more 
important, we begin by considering the net impact of aging on FDI. In Column (1) of 
Table 1, we combine US inbound and outbound FDI. Here, we find significant negative 
coefficients on both the home and host dependency ratios.36 This suggests that aging by 
                                                      
36 Domeij and Floden (2004) calibrate a dynamic, overlapping-generations model with endogenous 
international factor prices and find that their simulations match those experienced by the OECD, i.e. capital 
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either the home or the host reduces FDI, suggesting that for the home country capital 
market effects dominate whereas for the host, labor market effects are paramount.  
 Noting that a great deal of the variation in the data is due to the non-US country, 
we proceed by considering inbound and outbound FDI separately in Columns (2) and (3) 
respectively. This also aids with the skill-abundance problem noted above. In Column (2), 
the US is always the host. After including the trend term, US variables (those in 
GRAVITY jt) were insignificant and are therefore excluded in column 2 with their 
variation absorbed by the trend term. Similarly, the home country variables are excluded 
in the estimates on US outbound FDI in Column (3) and gain their variation is again 
absorbed by the trend.  In Column (2), our results confirm those from Column (1), i.e. 
FDI inflows are significantly negatively impacted by the dependency ratio of the home 
country. This suggests that a one percent increase in th  dependency ratio of the home 
country reduces FDI by around .6 percent. At the sample mean, this is a decrease in the 
sales of affiliates of about 2.4 million dollars.  
 In Column (3), we find a similar sign on the host dependency variable, although it 
falls outside the standard significance levels. Since there are omitted variables that may 
potentially bias our results, we repeat these three regressions but include country fixed 
effects. These results are reported in Columns (4) through (6) of Table 1. Once again, the 
home dependency ratio has a negative coefficient. The host variable, however, now has a 
positive coefficient. In no case, however, are these coefficients significant. There are a 
number of reasons why this might occur. First, our data set only covers a sixteen year 
time span. It is unlikely that each country would have significant variation in its 
                                                                                                                                                              
flows from old to young economies. They do not, however, test the significance of this mechanism relative 
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dependency ratio over such a short period. In addition, he dependency variable captures a 
number of aspects of aging. As our model in Section 2 demonstrates, these may have a 
conflicting impact on FDI. Consequently, this insignificance could be due to the 
agglomeration of the different aspects of aging. Our results below suggest this is indeed 
the case, highlighting the need to separately consider the various aspects of aging. 
 In Table 2, we separately consider the three aspect  of aging identified in our 
theoretical model. Therefore in these results, we use the dependency ratio 
(DEPENDENCY), national savings (NSAVING), and social security taxes (SS).37 Given 
our theoretical results, we expect positive coefficients for all of the home aging variables 
and negative ones for all of the host aging variables.38 The results of our statistical 
analysis are presented in Table 2. As shown, these results initially appear to be 
inconsistent with our theory since the home aging variables are significantly negative and 
the host dependency ratio is significantly positive. Inclusion of fixed effects only aids this 
issue by eliminating the significance of many of the aging variables. This latter is 
consistent with Weil (1994) who studies the impact of aging on savings across countries. 
He also finds that age variables become insignificant in fixed effects regressions.  
 One possible issue with these results, however, is that they combine data on rich 
and poor countries. There are a number of reasons why the underlying motivations for 
FDI may differ between these groups. As noted by Blonigen and Davies (2004), FDI data 
are often skewed with far greater amounts of FDI goin  into and coming from the 
developed countries creating data issues when combining these. Moreover, Markusen 
                                                                                                                                                              
to others. 
37 Note that limited data on SS reduces our sample size.
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(2002) contends that the motivation for FDI differs between developed and developing 
countries. While scale effects are generally more significant for capital flows between two 
developed countries, factor price differentials appear more relevant for FDI between a 
rich and a poor country. Consequently, one should expect that horizontal FDI is observed 
for rich economies and vertical FDI occurs between a rich and a poor country. Thus, the 
underlying data generating process differs, influencing estimates from our regressions.  
Furthermore, economic activity in developed countries is likely to differ from behavior in 
poor countries. As Table 3 illustrates, the dependency ratio is one example – developed 
countries (due to lower birth rates and higher life expectancies) have higher values. For 
these reasons, we break our sample into two groups: rich (Table 4) and poor (Table 5).39 
The list of rich countries is provided in the appendix. We also note that Ehrlich and 
Zhong (1998) in their study of fertility and savings also split their data between rich and 
poor countries because of large differences in the data generating process.  
 Table 4 presents our results for the rich country subsample. The estimates 
conform quite closely to those predicted by our theoretical model. For the inbound data, 
all three aging variables are positive without fixed effects and two are significant. When 
controlling for fixed effects only DEPENDENCY is significantly positive.40 For 
outbound FDI, the results that are most consistent with our framework occur when 
controlling for fixed effects. In that case we find egative coefficients on all three aging 
variables with significant coefficients on two of them.  
                                                                                                                                                              
38 Recall that SS is a proxy that is inversely related to the cost of raising capital, implying that this should 
have a positive coefficient for the home country and  negative coefficient for the host country. 
39 Separating the poor countries may also help with the possibility that FDI into this group is driven by the 
availability of natural resources (although to the extent that these do not vary over time the use of fixed 
effects also helps to alleviate this concern). 
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 Looking across the columns of Table 4, the home country dependency variable 
has a positive coefficient and it is significant when controlling for fixed effects. Using the 
value for the coefficient in column (5), we find tha  a one percent rise in the (non-U.S.) 
home dependency ratio increases capital exports to the United States by 1.6%. At the 
sample mean, this corresponds to a $247 million increase in FDI. As predicted by our 
framework, we find that population aging in the host country has a negative impact on 
FDI.  The host dependency ratio has a negative coeffi ient that is significant in the 
absence of fixed effects. Using the estimate from clumn (3), this suggests a 1 percent 
rise in the host’s dependency ratio leads to a decrease in U.S. affiliate sales by .1 percent. 
At the sample mean, this translates to a decline just under $251 million. 
 Similar results appear in terms of the effects of the social security tax burden. Our 
model predicts that higher social security obligations in the home country should increase 
outbound capital flows whereas higher obligations in the host country should be 
associated with lower capital imports. Using the results from column (2), a 1% increase in 
the parent country’s burden generates a .3% increase in capital flows to the United States. 
When controlling for fixed effects, we find that the same increase in the host country is 
associated with a .1% decrease in outbound FDI. Interes ingly, the results in column (1) 
show the combined impact on FDI with the United States. Evaluating at the sample mean, 
a one percent rise in home’s SS burden is associated wi h a $40 million increase in total 
FDI with the United States. A comparable increase for the host lowers FDI by $29 
million. 
                                                                                                                                                              
40 As noted by Floden (2003), the US is young relative o the rest of the rich countries suggesting that this 
subsample may conform more closely to our model. 
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The capital market effects are also found in the data. According to the theory, 
home's national savings rate should be positively correlated with FDI. We find that this is 
in fact the case in three of the four specifications. Furthermore, this coefficient is 
significant when excluding fixed effects. The host savings rate should be negatively 
correlated with FDI and we find that this too holds in three of the four regressions and is 
negative whenever the coefficient is significant. To give an idea of the magnitudes of 
these at the sample mean for Column (1), a one percent ise in home's national savings 
rate increases FDI by $298 million whereas a one percent rise in host's national savings 
rate decreases FDI by $262 million. 
Finally, in Table 5, we present results using only the poor country subsample. 
Here, as in the combined sample, the coefficients are often inconsistent with theory. 
According to the results without fixed effects, FDI is declining in the home dependency 
ratio, either country's social security burden, andthe savings rate of either country. These 
estimates contradict the predictions for the home country. Likewise, the estimated 
coefficient on the host dependency ratio is positive, not negative. For the inbound results 
in Column (2), in each case the estimates run counter to our model's predictions, even 
after controlling for fixed effects. This suggests that the data on FDI into the US from 
developing countries differs considerably from our theory. In Column (3), the estimates 
for US outbound FDI to developed countries matches t  theory with the exception of the 
dependency ratio. That coefficient indicates that US FDI to developing countries is 
attracted to older economies. Life expectancy, healt  care, and so forth are likely to 
increase longevity and therefore the dependency ratio. These same items are also likely to 
be correlated with stable, growing economies, i.e. features attractive to FDI. This suggests 
 32 
that these results may suffer from omitted variable bias. One method of dealing with this 
is to add fixed effects. Doing so brings the US outb nd results in Column (6) in line 
with theory.  
Before proceeding to the following section, we summarize the findings of our 
statistical analysis. The data suggests that the results for FDI with rich countries, either 
coming from or going to the US, conform very closely to the theory. This is particularly 
important since the rich countries have the most FDI with the United States. For example, 
in 1998, these countries comprised 73 percent of US affiliate sales abroad and 93 percent 
of foreign-owned affiliate sales in the United States. In addition, especially after 
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, we find the predicted results for US outbound 
FDI to the developing countries. The one shortcoming is in the match between the data on 
FDI in the US from developing countries and our theory. However, since these countries 
accounted for less than 7% of foreign-owned affiliate sales in the US, this shortcoming is 
relatively slight. Thus, the empirical results provide support for our theoretical 
framework. Importantly, our estimates show that when considering the impact of different 
population demographics for FDI between countries, it i  necessary to account for both 
the labor market and financial market effects, something not done in earlier work. 
 
4. Implications of Population Aging for International Tax Competition 
 Our benchmark model describes distinct channels in which population aging is 
likely to affect FDI and financial market activity across countries. In particular, due to the 
smaller effective labor force, the domestic rate of return to capital will be lower. In this 
manner, the model demonstrates that aging can lead to greater capital outflows. 
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Moreover, the results from regression analysis conform quite closely to the predictions of 
our theory.  
 Consequently, we have shown that changing demographic patterns will have a 
significant impact on the flow of capital between countries. In light of these important 
observations, policymakers must seek appropriate action. That is, in confronting the 
challenges of the emerging demographic crisis, how should governments attempt to 
regulate the extent of FDI? The academic literature has not yet addressed the connections 
between foreign direct investment and population agi g, however, some in the popular 
press and government have proposed that policy should encourage capital outflows. For 
example, Bernanke (2005) suggests that FDI is a beneficial route towards providing 
individuals with greater income in their golden years: 41 
“…one well-understood source of the saving glut is the strong saving motive of rich 
countries with aging populations, which must make provision for an impending sharp 
increase in the number of retirees relative to the number of workers...As a consequence 
of high desired saving and the low prospective returns to domestic investment, the 
mature industrial economies as a group seek to run current account surpluses and thus 
to lend abroad.” (Bernanke, 2005) 
 
 At the same time, governments substantially rely on intergenerational transfer 
programs such as public pensions to directly raise the income of the old. In recent years, 
this had led to a significant fiscal burden in many economies. For example, the 
Commission on Global Aging (2006) reports that payroll taxes would need to increase by 
more than 25% in developed countries in order to pay for the increased expenditures. 
 Since both FDI and public pension programs may be used to raise retirees’ 
incomes, we contend that policies in both areas should be carefully constructed. That is, 
                                                      
41 In addition, see the recent Senate testimony of Hewitt (2003). Siegel (2002) and Rothkopf (2004) 
advance similar arguments. 
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in order to confront the current problem of population aging, governments must balance 
taxation of multinational activity against the domestic tax burden on the current working 
population.  
 To address these important issues, we return to our benchmark model introduced 
in Section II.  In particular, we incorporate a budget constraint in which intergenerational 
transfer programs are funded by domestic payroll taxes.  For simplicity, we assume that 
all capital is owned by the old and that all labor is provided by the young.42 The income 
of home's old is therefore: 
 *I rK r Z C T= + − +  (36) 
where T are transfers from the government. Note that the old take these transfers as given 
and therefore do not internalize the impact of their d cisions on the equilibrium value of 
transfers.  In contrast to old agents, young individuals earn income through working. 
Consequently, their income is given by: 
 (1 )Y wL Eη= − − . (37) 
  
 The government is constrained to run a balanced budget, implying that transfers 
are equal to the sum of labor and capital tax revenue (if any as discussed below). 
Although we assume that the government’s budget may be partially financed by tax 
revenues from capital, they are not a source of intergenerational transfers since capital 
taxes are imposed upon the old. Thus, on net, the transfers are strictly funded by labor 
taxes imposed on the working population. 
 We next introduce the income constraints for the host country:  
                                                      
42 If we instead assume that each group owns a fixed portion of each of these, we obtain the same optimal 
taxation strategies for the countries, leading to the same qualitative Nash equilibrium. 
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 * * * * *I r K C T= − +  (38) 
and 
 * * * *Y w L E= − . (39) 
Unlike home, host capital taxes do act as a net income transfer to their old since the 
transfers are from the owners of capital at home. Thus, host transfers are given by:43 
 * * * * * *L KT f L t f Zη= +  (40) 
 Consistent with most tax policies, we assume that the home government offers its 
MNEs some form of relief from double taxation of its overseas profits. As a result, the 
relative effective tax paid on overseas profits (τ) may well differ from the statutory tax 




max{ , } if home offers credits








In practice, these two methods are by far the most widely used relief methods.44 Note that 
we are assuming that the home government has the ability to discriminate against foreign-
earned profits (since t does not apply to domestic capital earnings) and that host has the 
ability to discriminate between repatriated earnings and those earned by its own 
investors.45 Although many countries claim to use non-discriminatory or uniform 
                                                      
43 In general, intergenerational transfer programs are p y as you go programs in which payroll taxes are 
used to pay benefits to the old. In our setup, transfers in the host country are partially funded by earnings 
from taxation of capital. Although this deviates from standard practice in most countries, we retain the pay 
as you go feature in the home country. Moreover, from our perspective, the home economy is older than t e 
host. Consequently, this provides motivation for capital to flow to the host country in our framework. 
44 See Price Waterhouse Coopers (2004) for a detailed list of the relief methods used by various countries. 
A small number of developing countries use a third method: foreign tax deductions in which * *t t ttτ = + − . 
Given the rare use of deductions, we do not analyze them here for space.  
45 Since taxes on domestic capital cannot be used for intergenerational transfers, the distortions they cause 
in the capital market would lead governments to set th m to zero with the possibility of discrimination. 
Janeba (1995) and Davies (2003) consider uniform taxation and find that this does limit the size of the ax 
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taxation, evidence presented by Hines (1988) and Hufbauer (1992) shows that this is 
rarely true in practice. 
4.1 Exemptions 
 We begin to investigate the impact of population aging on international tax policy 
by studying the case of exemptions. Under exemptions, the home government does not 
impose any taxes on the earnings from its citizens’ capital in the foreign country. Since 
this implies that the home government does not restrict capital outflows, this would be 
consistent with a policy supporting the use of FDI to raise retirees’ incomes. However, in 
this setting, there are limits to the aging country’s ability to promote capital outflows 
because the relative effective tax rate is entirely driven by the host country’s capital tax 
rate. Consequently, exemptions provide a useful benchmark for comparison to other relief 
methods. In particular, the smaller strategy space (compared to credits) renders its 
analysis to be fairly tractable.  
Beginning with the home country, under exemptions transfers are determined by 
the government’s budget constraint: LT F Lη= . How then does FDI affect the ability of 
the home government to provide these transfers? To see this, consider how transfers 
respond to home’s only policy instrument, the labor tax rate η: 
 L LL KL KL
dT dL dK dZ
f L L F F LF
d d d d
η η
η η η η
 = + + − 
 
 (42) 
For a given supply of capital and labor, the higher tax rate allows the government to 
provide higher transfers to old individuals as indicted by the first term above. However, 
as emphasized in the social security literature, th higher payroll tax rate exacerbates 
                                                                                                                                                              
on outbound FDI. However, given the evidence cited above, we feel that the discriminatory case is more 
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factor market distortions. As an example, since the higher tax rate lowers the amount of 
employment, it also causes the amount of transfers to fall. In addition, since the decline in 
employment lowers the domestic return to capital, the stock of capital in the home 
country will be lower. In turn, this causes transfer  to fall since labor productivity falls.  
 Moreover, the final term above demonstrates that the increase in payroll taxes 
induces capital flight. Again, this lowers the tax base in the labor market since workers 
will be less productive. We view this observation t be particularly important in light of 
recent arguments that support increasing capital outflows to raise retirees’ incomes. 
Although foreign direct investment can provide the old with higher returns from their 
investments, it can also lower their income since it hampers the ability of the government 
to raise payroll tax revenues. Consequently, this capital flight effect provides motivation 
for capital-exporters to restrict outbound FDI in order to minimize the labor market 
distortion. Interestingly, we will turn to this issue when analyzing the case of foreign tax 
credits. In particular, in the credit case, home taxes on overseas earnings will act as a 
restriction on capital flight. 
 The capital flight effect from higher labor taxes, however, is only part of the total 
change in old income. We therefore next consider how the labor tax affects old income 
through earnings from capital, which is given by:  
 ( )1 * * * *(1 ) (1 )L KL KK KK LL KK K
dZ




−− − Ω + + − . (43) 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
appropriate. 
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The first term here is negative and represents the fall in the productivity of capital as the 
amount of home labor declines. The final term demonstrates that these losses to home 
capital owners are partially offset because capital can seek overseas labor through FDI. 
 Given these insights, we ask whether FDI helps alleviate the increasing financial 
burden from population aging. As suggested by a number of studies, population aging is 
likely to raise the tax burden imposed on the working population. However, do capital 
outflows exacerbate the problem? They might. As shown above, capital flight lowers the 
productivity of the workforce and public transfers. In this manner, FDI leads to less 
income for old-age individuals. On the other hand, i  response to the smaller domestic 
workforce, FDI allows owners of capital to earn higher returns abroad. The net impact of 
FDI on old-age income is given by: 
    ( )*(1 ) K KL dZf LF dτ η η− − .                                                 (44)      
To the extent that social security taxes add to the natural, demographic-driven decline in 
labor, FDI is a boon. At the same time, however, the capital flight decreases the tax base 
generated by the remaining labor, decreasing the effectiveness of social security taxes as a 
policy instrument.46 Interestingly, equation (44) demonstrates that the net impact crucially 
depends on the policies adopted by the hostgovernment. If the host chooses to encourage 
capital flows, it will assess a low tax rate on inbound FDI. As a result, FDI may help 
alleviate the demographic crisis in the home country. 
 Putting these effects together, the total change i old income is: 
                                                      
46 One implication that we do not address is that if some old derive their income primarily from government 
transfers while others derive it more from the return on investment, then FDI will have differential impacts 
on the income of different groups of the old. 
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 ( )( ){ }* 1 * * * * *(1 ) L K KL KK KK KK LL KL KK LL KK LdI t f f f C f C E f K C Z f C L fdη
−= − Ω ∆ − + + + . (44) 
The change in young income is: 
 ( )* 1 * * *1 (1 )(1 ) 0L KK KK LL LL KKdY f L t f C E f Cd ηη
−= − + − − Ω <  (45) 
since the second term lies between zero and -1.  
 We now turn to the effects of policies adopted by the host government. As 
emphasized in the discussion earlier, taxation imposed in the host country can determine 
whether FDI alleviates the fiscal burden from aging in the home country. Following the 
discussion for home, we begin by considering the impact of aging on intergenerational 
transfers. In this analysis, it is useful to note that Equation (12) can be rewritten so that: 












= −  (47) 
Consequently, the income of host's old moves with the host labor tax according to: 
( )
* *
* 1 * * * * * * * * 1 * * * * * * *
* * *L KL KK KK LL KK L K L L KK KK LL KK KL LL
dI dZ dL




− −= − Ω + + − Ω +
 (48) 
The first term is negative and represents the fall in capital income as higher labor taxes 
reduce the amount of host labor supplied. The finalthree terms reflect the total impact of 
higher labor taxes on government transfers. This con ists of two parts. First, as labor 
taxes rise, FDI falls, reducing the amount of capital tax revenue provided to the old (the 
second term in (48)). Second, as the labor tax rises, this impacts the level of 
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intergenerational transfers (the final two terms). The net effect is naturally ambiguous 
since as the labor tax rate rises, the labor income tax base shrinks. Finally, the impact of 
the payroll tax on young income is:  
 ( )
*
* * * 1 * * * * * * *
*
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) 0L L KL KK KK KL LL KL KL LL KK
dY




−= − − − − Ω + ∆ + − < (49) 
As host labor taxes rise, this reduces the after-tax equilibrium value of host labor income.  
 Finally, we turn to the effects of host’s additional policy instrument – the tax rate 
applied to inbound FDI. In the host country, capital inflows have the opposite impact on 
the income of the old. There, inbound FDI decreases th  rate of return on capital and 
increases the return on labor. The impact of the higher tax rate on retirees’ income is: 
( )
* *
* * * * * 1 * * * * * * * * 1 * * * *
* * *
( )K K K KK KK LL L K KL KK LL
dI dZ dL
f Z t f K t Z f f C E f L f f C E
dt dt dt
η η− −= + − + Ω ∆ + − Ω ∆
 (50) 
The first two terms partially capture the effect of higher taxes on tax revenues, essentially 
a tradeoff between the size of the tax base and host's share of that tax base. The rest of 
this effect is found in the third term which also includes the impact of higher taxes on 
host-owned capital income. The third term is positive, reflecting that as FDI is driven out, 
this raises the rate of return on domestic capital, benefiting the old.  
 The final two terms are negative and represent the otal effect on host labor tax 
revenue from increasing the tax on inbound FDI. Since i creasing the tax rate reduces the 
productivity of host labor along with the supply of host labor, raising the tax on inbound 
FDI reduces the ability of the host government to raise money for intergenerational 
transfers through labor market taxation.  
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 Turning to host's young, we find that the effect of the host tax is: 
 
*
* * 1 * * * *
*
(1 ) 0K KL KK LL
dY
L f f C E
dt
η −= − − Ω ∆ <  (51) 
i.e. as higher host capital taxes drives out FDI, the income derived from host labor falls.  
 While the preceding analysis demonstrates the numerous channels which affect 
employment and foreign direct investment, we conclude the exemptions case by studying 
the strategic behavior between both governments as in previous work on tax competition. 
To begin, we assume that the home government seeks to maximize national welfare:  
 ( ) ( )W U I V Y= +  (52) 
where U and V are increasing, concave functions that satisfy the Inada conditions.47 
Similarly, host national welfare is: 
 * * * * *( ) ( )W U I V Y= +  (53) 




d d dη η η
′ ′= + =  (54) 
i.e. home distributes income between the two groups while internalizing whatever factor 
market distortions this may cause. For the old, their income moves with the labor tax both 
because this tax affects the amount of transfers and because it affects the income they 
earn from capital. Plugging these into home's first-o der condition, it is then possible to 
solve for home's optimal labor tax. In what follows, e assume that this optimal tax is 
positive, consistent with the common practice of implementing such taxes.  
                                                      
47 An alternative interpretation of this social welfare function is one that is additively separable in the 
returns to two factors, capital and labor. Thus, our results for tax competition also provide new results on 
the effect of tax competition in a model in which the tax authority cares about the distribution of income 
between factors, results that are not obtained in the models with pure national income maximization. 
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d d dη η η










′ ′= + = . (56) 
The host capital tax will therefore balance out these various effects, taking into account 
the relative weights given to the two groups in Equation (53). Denote the best response 
capital tax rate as * ( )et η .  
 Combining together the three equilibrium tax equations, one for home and two for 
host, yields the equilibrium under exemptions. Denot  the equilibrium values by eη , 
*
eη , 
and *et . Note that since the host will not find it desirable to choke off capital flows, 
* 1et < . 
Also, it is important to recognize that as the host becomes increasingly reliant on 
intergenerational transfers as a method of supporting the old (such as would occur if the 
cost of raising capital were to increase from an increase in β*), FDI will become more 
desirable because it increases the productivity of he host labor force.  
 The primary lesson is that higher taxes discourage inbound FDI, hindering the 
ability of the host government to raise income through labor taxes. Therefore, it may even 
be that the optimal capital tax is non-positive. This differs from standard results in tax 
models in which the host country is large, i.e. does not face a perfectly elastic capital 
supply function. Therefore, as host countries age, implying an increase in the need for 
intergenerational transfers, it may well be the case that taxes on inbound capital will fall, 
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a result consistent with the results of Slemrod (2004). Furthermore, one might expect an 
increase in the incentives given to FDI (i.e. * 0t < ). 
4.2. Credits 
 In this section, we introduce the home capital tax by investigating the use of 
credits as a tax relief method. In particular, thisallows us to draw insights into whether 
aging is likely to affect the design of international tax relief methods. Under foreign tax 
credits, the relative effective tax is equal to the gr ater of the two country's tax rates. This 
creates two differences in optimal taxation relative to the exemptions case. First, the 
home capital tax creates a lower bound on the effective tax, whereas in the exemptions 
case, the host could achieve any effective tax it desired. Second, the home country can 
influence the effective tax by setting its tax rate bove the host's.  
We begin by analyzing how these factors affect the host capital tax. For a given 
pair of home tax rates, host can match home's capital tax without impacting factor 
supplies since doing so does not alter the effectiv tax and therefore does not affect factor 
market equilibria. Matching the home tax does however increase host's capital tax 









′= >  (57) 
implying that host will at least match the home tax.  
In contrast, if *t t≥ , the tradeoffs become identical to those host faced in the 
exemption case. At * ( )et t η≥ , where the exact host capital tax under exemptions depends 
on the home labor tax under consideration, then host will choose to merely match the 
home tax. On the other hand, for * ( )et t η< , then host will prefer to increase its tax, and 
 44 
therefore the effective tax, to the level it would choose under exemptions that corresponds 
to the home labor tax under consideration. Therefore h st's best response capital tax is: 
 
* *












As for host's labor tax, its tradeoffs are the same s in the exemptions case, although 
naturally the equilibrium value may well differ depending on the effective tax and the 
home labor tax.  
Turning now to the home country's choice of capital tax, we find that it is similar 
to that of the host's under exemptions in that it affects the old both through the income 
derived from capital and through the level of intergenerational transfers. Comparable to 
host, we assume that all home capital tax revenue is distributed to the old as a lump sum 
transfer that the old take as given. Although the colle tion and return of taxes by the 
home government does not create a transfer as in the host case, if the home government 
affects the effective tax, this does alter FDI and the income derived from capital. If home 
chooses a *t t≤ , it does not affect the effective tax and therefor has no impact on the 
equilibrium. It turns out, however, that home will find it desirable to set *t t>  because 
this both increases capital income and the level of intergenerational transfers. 
To see the first of these, recall that in equilibrium, firms choose FDI such that: 
 *(1 )K KF Fτ= − . (12) 
However, the choice of FDI that maximizes home capital income is: 
 * * *(1 )K K KKF t F F Z = − +  . (59) 
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The last term in this equation represents the extent to which the capital-exporting home 
country influences the rate of return on capital overseas. Individual investors consider 
themselves small in the host capital market and therefore equate the rate of return at home 
to the after-tax rate of return overseas. The home gov rnment, however, recognizes the 
cumulative impact of its investors on the overseas rate of return. When home neither 
encourage nor discourages FDI, i.e. *tτ = , home investors over export capital relative to 
the level dictated by (59). Thus, just as a large country can benefit by intervening and 
increasing the terms of trade price for its exported good, the home country can increase 
national income by restricting exports of capital.48 
 In addition, the impact of the capital tax on labor tax revenue is: 
 ( )1 * * (1 ) 0L K KL KK L LL
d F L




−= Ω ∆ − + > . (60) 
By restricting capital outflows, for a given home labor tax, both domestic labor 
productivity and employment will be higher. Both raise intergenerational transfers and 
reduce the need for high home labor taxes. Combining these, we see that at *t t τ= = , 
 1 * * * *(1 ) 0L KL KL LL K KK KK LL
dI dL dK dZ dL
f L f f f f f C E
dt d d d d
η η
τ τ τ τ
− = − − + + − Ω ∆ > 
 
 (61) 
where the first two terms represent the increase in intergenerational transfers and the third 
term captures the boost to capital income from exploiting home's terms of trade power in 
world capital markets. In terms of the income of young workers in the home country, at 
*t t τ= = , we observe that: 
                                                      
48 The strategy, initially identified by Bond and Samuelson (1989), is an extension of the importation of 
labor argument put forth by Ramaswami (1968). Davies and Gresik (2003) extend this to a many goods, 
many factors setting and find conditions under which this strategy can still be employed by a capital 
exporter. 
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 1 * *(1 ) 0KK K KL LL
dY
C L f f E
dt
η −= − Ω ∆ >  (62) 
This demonstrates that restricting capital outflows more than the host tax already does 
also raises the income of young individuals in the home country.  
 Notably, higher payroll taxes lead to an intergenerational conflict – as they 
potentially raise the income of the old by providing them with greater transfers, the higher 
taxes impose a cost on the working population. In co trast, in the case of credits, 
imposing a higher tax rate on foreign capital earnings raises the income of both the young 







>  (63) 
 As stated above, it has been suggested that governments should encourage FDI to 
contend with the aging crisis. However, we find that a capital exporter would prefer to 
restrict such outflows. This occurs for two reasons. First, a higher effective tax rate allows 
the home government to exploit its influence in world capital markets which can help 
fund intergenerational transfers. Moreover, even small capital exporters have incentives 
to tax outbound capital flows – in order to minimize factor market distortions from aging, 
governments need to restrict capital flight in order to maintain a productive domestic 
labor force. This provides the home government with a larger tax base to fund old-age 
transfer programs. Interestingly, our insights are new to the literature on tax competition 
where small countries do not have incentives to tax FDI (e.g. Mintz and Tulkins, 1996).  
 Thus, under credits, home's best response is: 
 * * *( , )ct t tη ≥  (64) 
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with equality only when * 1t = , i.e. 0Z =  and there is no further impact of raising the 
effective tax. Combining home and host's best respon e capital taxes yields the unique 
Nash equilibrium:  
 * 1c ct t= =  (65) 
Consequently, in the equilibrium under credits, FDI does not occur. This result is similar 
to that found by Bond and Samuelson (1989) and Davies and Gresik (2003). However, 
we demonstrate that the financial burden from increasing population aging leads to stiffer 
tax competition on the part of the home government. 
 Floden (2003) also finds that capital outflows will exacerbate the problems that an 
aging workforce places on its government's obligation o provide benefits. However, he 
notes that his results "do not provide an argument for [aging] European countries to 
actually restrict capital mobility (pg. 11)". This is a result of his small country 
assumption. By way of contrast, we allow for endogenous factor prices and show that for 
the capital exporter, the desire to reduce outflows due to budgetary reasons is bolstered by 
incentives to manipulate international factor prices.   
 As for home's labor tax, its tradeoffs remain the same as those in the exemption 
case, although the factor market equilibria differs considerably. To calculate this 
equilibrium value, as well as that for host, one would simply set 0Z =  and 1τ =  in the 
appropriate first-order conditions from the exemption case and solve for these taxes.   
 At this juncture, we would like to make some remarks about the links between 
population aging, foreign direct investment, and the design and incidence of international 
tax relief methods. We begin with the host country. Under exemptions, the host would 
not seek to completely cut off capital flows. Since FDI does not take place under credits, 
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host retirees’ incomes from capital will be lower. As a result, the credit relief method 
unambiguously hurts the host country’s ability to pr vide for its elderly.  
 Moreover, as mentioned, the results under exemptions provide an explanation for 
recently declining corporate tax rates pointed out by Slemrod (2004). As host countries 
encounter increasing population aging, there will be a greater need to fund 
intergenerational transfers. If countries lower the tax rate on inbound capital flows, the 
productivity of the domestic workforce will improve. This allows the government to fund 
higher levels of transfers without increasing the tax burden on the working population. 
 Similarly, although home would prefer to restrict its capital outflows relative to 
those in the exemption equilibrium, it would not unilaterally eliminate outbound FDI. 
Therefore for it too credits are less preferable than exemptions. However, this does not in 
itself imply that credits hinder home’s ability to provide for its old since the lower capital 
income under credits may be offset by the relative ease of imposing higher payroll taxes, 
raising the income of home’s old. What remains true, however, is that any such benefits 
to the old come at such costs to the young that national welfare falls. Because of these 
difficulties created by mobile capital and the conflict across countries as they attempt to 
provide intergenerational transfers, we conclude that t ere will be a greater need for 
policy coordination across countries to contend with the aging crisis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 Concerns over the sustainability of pay-as-you-go social security programs in the 
face of aging populations are long-standing, with Pellechio (1979) providing just one 
early example. Among the various methods that have been proposed for dealing with the 
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fiscal implications of this demographic shift has been the promotion of FDI. In an 
endogenous model of factor supplies and factor prices, we find that FDI should naturally 
be expected to react to these changes and that – par icularly among the developed 
countries – FDI does indeed appear to respond as our theory predicts. We then extend our 
analysis to ask whether in such a setting outbound FDI is likely to be encouraged by the 
capital exporter. We find that the result is much the opposite. Because aging places 
increasing demands on raising intergenerational transfers through labor income taxation, 
restricting FDI and thereby increasing domestic labor income seems to be a capital 
exporter's preferred strategy. In the tax competition game under credits, this reinforces the 
previously recognized forces that drive FDI to inefficiently low equilibrium levels.  
 One interesting comparison involves immigration as an alternative to promoting 
outbound FDI. Storesletten (2000) constructs a calibrated general equilibrium model with 
overlapping generations to examine this possibility. In particular, the author finds that 
allowing immigration of medium and high-skilled worke s may indeed resolve many of 
the problems of aging in the United States. Although these workers do not bring 
additional physical capital, the increase in productivity they bring outweighs any adverse 
effects of higher interest rates (and therefore capital available for public debt). 
Consequently, Storesletten calculates that the immediate gains outweigh the future costs 
of pension benefits to these immigrants.  
 Interestingly, in our tractable framework based upon constant returns to scale in 
production, perfect competition, and identical technologies (as is standard in the 
Hecksher-Ohlin tradition of trade theory), immigration and FDI work in the same fashion. 
There is, however, a key difference – inbound labor rep esents an increase in the tax base 
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for intergenerational transfers. Rather than FDI, suppose there is a small immigration of 
young foreign workers (who are by definition more poductive than the average worker 
since the old do not work). This immigration increas s labor income in home, increasing 
the level of intergenerational transfers without needing to increase the home labor tax. In 
addition, the boost in labor supply increases home's domestic capital income which is 
host-tax free. Thus, allowing immigration instead of FDI provides many of the benefits to 
home that outbound FDI achieves. In this manner, our results also suggest that aging 
capital exporters may well find it desirable to import labor. According to Jackson (2002), 
such policies are already under consideration by aging economies such as Japan and 
Germany. Nevertheless, Helliwell (2004) casts doubt on whether these international 
factor movements alone will be enough to overcome the fiscal crises.  
 An important caveat to our analysis is that technology is constant in our model. 
One of the attractive features of FDI is that it promotes technological diffusion and may 
increase the growth rate of productivity. Although the magnitude of such spillovers is still 
open to debate, evidence for them has been found in both inbound and outbound FDI (see 
Blomström and Kokko (1998) for a survey of this literature). Of particular interest here 
are the results of Braconier and Ekholm (2000) who find that more FDI by Swedish 
multinationals in high-wage countries tends to boost wages in Sweden. Thus, if allowing 
outbound investment spurs productivity of domestic workers, this may partially counter 
the factor price and revenue effects noted above. In any case, the challenges posed by the 
aging of the world's population clearly warrant continued research and we hope that this 
paper begins a debate on the role of foreign direct nvestment in resolving the crisis.  
 51 
References 
Bernanke, Ben S. (2005). “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account 
Deficit,” Speech given on March 10, 2005 at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association 
of Economists, Richmond, Virginia. 
 
Bhattacharya, Joydeep, Casey B. Mulligan and Robert R. Reed III. (2004). “Labor Market 
Search and Optimal Retirement Policy,” Economic Inquiry, 42(4), pp. 560-571. 
 
Blomström, Magnus and Ari Kokko.  (1998) “Multinational Corporations and 
Spillovers,” Journal of Economic Surveys 12, 247-77. 
 
Blonigen, Bruce A. and Ronald B. Davies (2004). “The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties 
on U.S. FDI Activity,” International Tax and Public Finance, 11(5), pp. 601-622. 
 
Blonigen, Bruce A., Ronald B. Davies and Keith Head. (2003). “Estimating the 
Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise: Comment.” American 
Economic Review, 93, 980-994. 
 
Boersch-Supan, Axel, Ludwig, Alexander, and Winter, Joachim (2001). "Aging and 
International Capital Flows," NBER Working Paper No. 8553. 
 
Bond, E. and L. Samuelson (1989), “Strategic Behavior and the Rules for International  
Taxation of Capital,” Economic Journal 99, 1099-1011. 
 
Braconier, Henrik and Ekholm, Karolina (2000) “Swedish Multinationals and 
Competition from high and low wage locations,” Review of International Economics, 
8(3), pp. 448-461. 
 
Brainard, S.  Lael.  (1997) “An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration 
Trade-off Between Multinational Sales and Trade,” American Economic Review 87(4): 
520-44. 
 
Brooks, Robin (2003). "Population Aging and Global C pital Flows in a Parallel 
Universe," IMF Staff Papers 50 (2). 200-221. 
 
Carr, D., Markusen, J. & Maskus, K. (2001). Estimating the knowledge-capital model of 
the multinational enterprise. American Economic Review, 91 (3), 693-708.  
 
Costa, Dora L. The Evolution of Retirement: An American Economic History, 1880-1990. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press for NBER, 1998. 
 
Cutler, D. J. Poterba, L. Sheiner, and L. Summers. (1990) "An Aging Society: 
Opportunity or Challenge?" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 1-73. 
 
 52 
Davies, Ronald B. (2003). “The OECD Model Tax Treaty: Tax Competition and Two-
Way Capital Flows,” International Economic Review, 44(2), pp. 725-753. 
 
Davies, Ronald B. and Thomas A. Gresik (2003). “Tax competition and foreign capital,” 
International Tax and Public Finance, 10(2), pp. 127-145. 
 
Domeij, David and Martin Floden (2004) "Population Aging and International Capital 
Flows," Working Paper. 
 
Eaton, Jonathan and Akiko Tamura.  (1994) “Bilateralism and Regionalism in Japanese 
and US Trade and Direct Foreign Investment Patterns," Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economies 8(4), 478-510. 
 
Ehrlich, Isaac and Francis T. Lui (1998). "Social Security, the Family, and Economic 
Growth." Economic Inquiry, 36 (3): 390-409.  
 
Ehrlich, Isaac and Jian-Guo Zhong (1998), "Social Security and the Real Economy: An 
Inquiry into Some Neglected Issues," American Economic Review (Papers and 
Proceedings) 88 (2): 151-157. 
 
Feenstra, R. (2004). Advanced International Trade: Th ory and Evidence. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Feinberg, Susan E. and Michael P. Keane, “US-Canada Trade Liberalization and MNC 
Production Location,” Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (2001): 118-32. 
 
Feldstein, M. and C. Horioka (1980), “Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows,” 
Economic Journal 90, 314-329. 
 
Floden, Martin (2003) Public Saving and Policy Coordination in Aging Economies, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105 (3): 379-400. 
 
Global Commission on Aging (2006) http://www.csis.org/gai/ Accessed May 24, 2006. 
 
Gresik, T., 2001. The taxing task of taxing transnationals. Journal of Economic Literature 
39 (3), 800-838. 
 
Gruber, Jonathan and David Wise (1998), "Social Security and Retirement: An 
International Comparison," The American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 
88 (2): 158-163. 
 
Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni, and Matthew J. Slaughter, “Vertical 




Hartman, D., 1985. Tax policy and foreign direct investment. Journal of Public 
Economics 26 (1), 107-121. 
 
Helliwell, John F. (2004), "Demographic Changes andInternational Factor Mobility," 
NBER Working Paper No. 10945. 
 
Hewitt, Paul S. (2003). “Testimony before the Senat Select Committee on Aging in 
Global Aging: Opportunity or Threat for the U.S. Economy?” February 27, 2003. 
 
Horika, Charles Y. (1989), "Why is Japan's Saving Rate So High?" in Developments in 
Japanese Economics, Ryuzo Sato and Takashi Negishi, eds. (Tokyo: Academic Press). 
 
Houthakker, Hendrick S. (1965) "On Some Determinants of Saving in Developed and 
Under-developed countries," in Problems of Economic Development, E. Robinson, ed. 
(London: Macmillan). 
 
Helpman, E. (1984). A simple theory of international tr de with multinational 
corporations. Journal of Political Economy, 94 (3), 451-71. 
 
Higgins, Matthew (1998). Demography, National Savings, and International Capital 
Flows, International Economic Review, 39 (2): 343-369. 
 
Higgins, M. and J. Williamson (1996). Asian Demography and Foreign Capital 
Dependence, NBER 5580. 
 
Hines, J. R. Jr., "Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment," in L. Summers, ed., Tax 
Policy and the Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 33-61. 
 
Hufbauer, G., U. S. Taxation of International Income: Blueprint for Reform (Washington, 
D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992). 
 
Jackson, Richard (2002). The Global Retirement Crisis: The Threat to World 
Sustainability and What to Do About It, Center for Strategic and International Studies: 
Washington D.C. 
 
Jones, R., I. Coehlo and S. Easton (1986). “The Theory of International Factor Flows:  
The Basic Model,” Journal of International Economics 20, 313-327. 
 
Markusen, J. (1984). Multinationals, multi-plant economies and the gains from trade. 
Journal of International Economics, 16 (3-4), 205-26. 
 
Markusen, J. (2002), Multinational firms and the theory of international trade. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
 54 
Markusen, James R.  and Keith E.  Maskus.  (2002) “Discriminating among alternative 
theories of the multinational enterprise.” Review of International Economics 10(4), 694-
707. 
 
Mintz, J. and H. Tulkens, “Optimality Properties of Alternative Systems of Taxation of 
Foreign Capital Income,” Journal of Public Economics 60 (1996), 373-399. 
 
Modigliani, Franco and Arlie Sterling (1983) "Determinants of Private Saving with 
Special Reference to the Role of Social Security – Cross-Country Tests," in The 
Determinants of National Saving, Franco Modigliani and Richard Hemming, eds. (New 
York: St. Martin's Press). 
 
Parnes, H.S. and G. Nestel. “The Retirement Experience,” in Work and Retirement, 
edited by H.S. Parnes. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981. 
 
Pellechio, Anthony J. (1979), "Social Security Financing and Retirement Behavior," The 
American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 69 (2): 284-287. 
 
Poterba, James M. (1998). "Population Age Structure and Asset Returns: An Empirical 
Investigation." NBER 6774. 
 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2004) Corporate Taxes 2004-2005: Worldwide Summaries, 
Wiley & Sons: Hoboken, NJ. 
 
Profeta, Paola (2002). "Aging and Retirement: Evidence Across Countries," International 
Tax and Public Finance, 9, 651-672. 
 
Ramaswami, V. (1968). "International factor movement and the national advantage," 
Economica 35:309-310. 
 
Robinson, P.K., S. Coberly, and C.E. Paul. “Work and Retirement,” in Handbook of 
Aging and the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., edited by R.H. Binstock and E. Shanas. New 
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1982. 
 
Rothkopf, David J. (2004) "The Coming Battle of theAges," The Washington Post, 
February 1, 2004, p. B3. 
 
Schieber, Sylvester J. and John B. Shoven (1996) "Social Security Reform: Around the 
World in 80 Ways," The American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 86 (2) 
pp. 373-377. 
 
Schulz, J.H. The Economics of Aging. Westport: Auburn House, 2001. 
 
Siegel, Jeremy (2002) Stocks for the Long Run: the definitive guide to financial market 
returns and long-term investment strategies, 3rd Ed. McGraw Hill: New York. 
 55 
Sinn, H. W., 1993. Taxation and the birth of foreign subsidiaries. In: Heberg, H., Long, 
N. (Eds.), Trade, Welfare, and Economic Policies, Essays in Hoor f Murray C. Kemp, 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
 
Slaughter, Matthew J. (2000), "Production transfer within multinational enterprises and 
American wages," Journal of International Economics, 50 (2), pp. 449-472. 
 
Slemrod, Joel (2004). “Are Corporate Rates, or Countries, Converging?” Journal of 
Public Economics, 88(6), pp. 1169-1186. 
 
Social Security Administration (2005), Status of the Social Security and Medicare 
Programs, Washington, D.C. 
 
Storesletten, Kjetil (2000). "Sustaining Fiscal Policy Through Immigration," The Journal 
of Political Economy, 108 (2), pp. 300-323. 
 
Summers, R., Heston, A., 1991. The Penn-World table (Mark 5): an expanded set of 
international comparisons, 1950 – 1988. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (2), 327-
368. 
 
Waldkirch, Andreas, “Comparative Advantage FDI? A Host Country Perspective,” 
Unpublished (2003). 
 
Weil, David N. (1994). "The Saving of the Elderly in Micro and Macro Data," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1): 55-81. 
 
Wilson, J. (1987), “Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition,” Journal of Political  
Economy 95, 835-856. 
 
Wilson, J., 1999. Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal 52, 269-304. 
 
World Bank (2004), World Development Indicators, Washington DC. 
 
Yeaple, Stephen R., “The Role of Skill Endowments i the Structure of U.S. Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 85 (2003): 726-34. 
 56 
Table 1: OLS Results for U.S. FDI 
 
 All Inbound Outbound All Inbound Outbound 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
hm_DEPENDENCY -0.516*** -0.646***  -0.070 -0.270  
 (3.35) (4.02)  (0.20) (0.81)  
ht_DEPENDENCY -0.381**  -0.146 0.304  0.369 
 (2.49)  (0.97) (0.82)  (0.77) 
hm_INVEST 0.080 0.214  -0.303 -0.288  
 (0.37) (1.00)  (1.46) (1.47)  
ht_INVEST 0.100  -0.505** 0.119  -0.110 
 (0.52)  (2.54) (0.49)  (0.50) 
hm_GDP 1.132*** 1.122***  -0.273 1.032  
 (20.19) (18.38)  (0.38) (1.25)  
ht_GDP 0.663***  0.678*** -0.579  -1.926*** 
 (8.71)  (9.36) (0.80)  (3.26) 
hm_SKILL 2.032*** 1.672***  3.059*** 2.240**  
 (12.84) (10.00)  (3.85) (2.36)  
ht_SKILL 0.459**  1.025*** 1.560*  2.709*** 
 (2.34)  (4.65) (1.92)  (3.22) 
hm_TCOST -0.344*** -0.316**  -1.388*** -0.553  
 (2.60) (2.33)  (3.95) (1.55)  
ht_TCOST -0.047  -0.027 -1.143***  -2.508*** 
 (0.27)  (0.18) (3.14)  (7.15) 
ht_ICOST -2.280***  -3.935*** -0.063  -0.830 
 (3.51)  (5.95) (0.13)  (1.47) 
FX 0.019 -0.100*** 0.068*** 0.001 0.009 -0.008 
 (1.28) (3.77) (4.69) (0.06) (0.11) (0.63) 
DISTANCE -0.516*** -0.478*** -0.594***    
 (7.66) (4.59) (8.10)    
TREND -0.042*** 0.014 0.008 -0.073** 0.010 -0.007 
 (2.63) (0.90) (0.57) (2.16) (0.58) (0.55) 
RICH 1.608*** 2.541*** -0.331**    
 (11.45) (13.78) (2.16)    
Constant -62.547*** -30.176*** -22.701*** -26.637 -35.645*** 9.658 
 (19.29) (14.71) (12.30) (1.56) (4.15) (1.52) 
Observations 1462 815 647 1462 815 647 
R-squared 0.78 0.79 0.59 0.92 0.96 0.95 
Fixed Effects    Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
hm=home; ht=host. 
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Table 2: OLS Results for U.S. FDI 
 
 All Inbound Outbound All Inbound Outbound 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
hm_DEPENDENCY -1.257*** -1.255***  -0.481 0.068  
 (7.55) (7.18)  (1.31) (0.11)  
ht_DEPENDENCY 0.126  0.269*** 0.522  -0.374*** 
 (1.26)  (2.75) (1.44)  (2.74) 
hm_SS -0.372*** -0.274***  -0.048 0.097  
 (4.36) (3.34)  (0.56) (1.09)  
ht_SS -0.173***  -0.301*** 0.119**  -0.007 
 (2.74)  (4.53) (1.97)  (0.23) 
hm_NSAVING -1.026*** -0.770**  -0.146 -0.476*  
 (3.00) (2.19)  (0.54) (1.83)  
ht_NSAVING -1.211***  -0.967*** -0.566**  -0.147 
 (4.98)  (4.25) (2.42)  (1.47) 
hm_INVEST -1.546*** -0.969***  -0.512 -0.149  
 (5.02) (2.67)  (1.40) (0.52)  
ht_INVEST 0.199  -0.438* 1.043***  0.535*** 
 (0.79)  (1.67) (3.17)  (3.04) 
hm_GDP 1.447*** 1.387***  -1.209 0.196  
 (22.52) (19.67)  (1.30) (0.15)  
ht_GDP 0.922***  0.957*** -1.622*  -2.227*** 
 (12.58)  (16.46) (1.69)  (3.78) 
hm_SKILL 4.001*** 3.178***  4.361*** 3.052**  
 (15.98) (10.43)  (3.91) (2.03)  
ht_SKILL 0.150  0.835*** 1.526  3.491*** 
 (0.62)  (3.21) (1.35)  (4.46) 
hm_TCOST -1.228*** -1.032***  -1.682*** -0.710  
 (6.60) (5.13)  (2.67) (1.30)  
ht_TCOST -0.069  -0.202 -0.679  -1.315*** 
 (0.33)  (1.05) (1.09)  (5.02) 
ht_ICOST -3.827***  -4.634*** -1.192**  1.119** 
 (6.88)  (8.40) (2.36)  (2.37) 
FX 0.049*** -0.137*** 0.120*** 0.004 -0.129 -0.010 
 (2.73) (4.50) (6.15) (0.32) (1.37) (0.94) 
DISTANCE -0.662*** -0.553*** -0.702***    
 (7.98) (3.81) (10.20)    
TREND -0.113*** -0.027 -0.004 -0.039 0.008 0.022** 
 (5.67) (1.44) (0.24) (0.84) (0.33) (2.13) 
RICH 0.499*** 1.327*** -0.743***    
 (2.71) (4.88) (3.74)    
Constant -83.981*** -44.340*** -23.273*** -2.853 -26.272** 16.621*** 
 (19.17) (12.95) (11.35) (0.14) (1.97) (2.66) 
Observations 974 491 483 974 491 483 
R-squared 0.78 0.81 0.67 0.92 0.97 0.98 
Fixed Effects    Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
hm=home; ht=host. 
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Jordan 4.9  Argentina 15.4
Bangladesh 5.4  Netherlands 15.8
Korea, Rep. 5.5  Barbados 15.9
Morocco 6.4  Israel 15.9
Guatemala 6.6  Luxembourg 16.4




Indonesia 6.9  Iceland 17.9
Iran, Islamic Rep. 6.9  Australia 18.1
Peru 6.9  Canada 18.2
Egypt, Arab Rep. 7  Romania 18.8
Colombia 7.5  Slovenia 18.9
Brazil 7.6  Poland 19.1
El Salvador 7.7  USA 19.3
Venezuela, RB 7.7  Finland 21.8
India 7.9  United Kingdom 22.2
Thailand 7.9  Switzerland 22.3
Turkey 8.2  Denmark 22.4
Yemen, Rep. 8.8  Austria 22.7
Trinidad and Tobago 9  Germany 23.1
Ukraine 9.1  Japan 23.4
China 9.8  Spain 23.8
Chile 10.7  France 24
Kazakhstan 10.9  Belgium 24.6
New Zealand 11.3  Italy 25.8
Jamaica 11.7  Sweden 27.2
Norway 12.3  
Uruguay 13.9  
Hong Kong, China 14.7  
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 Table 4: OLS Results for US FDI with Rich Countries 
 
 All Inbound Outbound All Inbound Outbound 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
hm_DEPENDENCY 0.005 0.048  0.859** 1.615***  
 (0.05) (0.54)  (2.58) (7.30)  
ht_DEPENDENCY -0.275***  -0.097* 0.477  -0.061 
 (3.26)  (1.70) (1.44)  (0.53) 
hm_SS 0.200** 0.284***  0.076 0.115  
 (2.17) (4.21)  (0.83) (1.37)  
ht_SS -0.143***  -0.010 -0.031  -0.111*** 
 (3.25)  (0.30) (0.48)  (5.68) 
hm_NSAVING 1.481*** 1.239***  0.527 -0.447*  
 (2.99) (2.81)  (1.59) (1.67)  
ht_NSAVING -1.293***  0.377 -0.860***  -0.274** 
 (3.47)  (1.55) (2.72)  (2.36) 
hm_INVEST -2.474*** -2.535***  -0.811*** -0.328  
 (7.16) (7.07)  (2.62) (0.90)  
ht_INVEST -0.075  0.493** 1.016***  0.451*** 
 (0.22)  (2.15) (3.41)  (3.21) 
hm_GDP 1.287*** 1.271***  -4.563*** -6.211***  
 (13.37) (15.85)  (3.55) (3.21)  
ht_GDP 1.297***  1.378*** -4.517***  -1.452* 
 (23.21)  (35.37) (3.52)  (1.88) 
hm_SKILL 2.137*** 2.922***  5.729*** 7.335***  
 (6.72) (8.45)  (4.78) (3.96)  
ht_SKILL -0.040  -0.328 4.719***  1.955** 
 (0.11)  (1.28) (4.00)  (2.57) 
hm_TCOST -1.190*** -0.602***  -0.294 0.233  
 (4.74) (2.87)  (0.76) (0.42)  
ht_TCOST -1.258***  -1.499*** -0.407  -1.432*** 
 (8.30)  (13.74) (1.01)  (6.74) 
ht_ICOST -4.095***  -0.852* -0.095  -0.619** 
 (8.82)  (1.93) (0.22)  (2.50) 
FX -0.179*** -0.402*** 0.098*** -0.114*** -0.118 0.291*** 
 (8.95) (19.37) (4.70) (9.76) (0.62) (4.54) 
DISTANCE -0.563*** -0.097 -0.437***    
 (11.52) (1.57) (9.08)    
TREND -0.099*** -0.008 -0.006 0.075* 0.083*** 0.009 
 (5.40) (0.50) (0.70) (1.89) (3.64) (1.09) 
Constant -79.052*** -41.969*** -21.935*** 95.155*** 63.295*** 11.308 
 (15.68) (12.13) (13.22) (2.89) (3.11) (1.33) 
Observations 474 229 245 474 229 245 
R-squared 0.84 0.88 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.99 
Fixed Effects    Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 








Table 5: OLS Results for US FDI with Poor Countries 
 
 All Inbound Outbound All Inbound Outbound 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
hm_DEPENDENCY -1.636*** -1.763***  -1.216* -1.623**  
 (6.56) (7.36)  (1.94) (2.53)  
ht_DEPENDENCY 0.526***  0.480*** 0.890  -0.974** 
 (3.12)  (2.92) (1.46)  (2.54) 
hm_SS -0.695*** -0.626***  0.194 0.043  
 (4.79) (4.45)  (1.01) (0.19)  
ht_SS -0.578***  -0.570*** 0.328**  -0.091 
 (4.65)  (4.60) (2.34)  (0.93) 
hm_NSAVING -1.614*** -1.321***  -0.511* -0.528*  
 (3.66) (3.21)  (1.69) (1.72)  
ht_NSAVING -0.918***  -1.249*** -0.026  -0.208* 
 (3.06)  (3.67) (0.11)  (1.72) 
hm_INVEST -1.396*** -1.103**  -0.652 -0.256  
 (3.26) (2.43)  (1.48) (0.74)  
ht_INVEST -0.076  -0.409 0.569  0.652*** 
 (0.22)  (1.07) (1.45)  (2.82) 
hm_GDP 1.302*** 1.306***  0.521 0.209  
 (11.50) (9.31)  (0.36) (0.12)  
ht_GDP 0.377**  0.772*** -0.571  -3.551*** 
 (2.29)  (4.75) (0.39)  (3.70) 
hm_SKILL 4.442*** 4.035***  2.745 3.410*  
 (13.03) (11.25)  (1.55) (1.69)  
ht_SKILL 0.773*  0.727* -0.656  4.979*** 
 (1.92)  (1.72) (0.35)  (3.71) 
hm_TCOST -0.573* -0.769**  -2.349*** -0.954  
 (1.68) (2.13)  (3.29) (1.53)  
ht_TCOST 0.473  0.031 -0.998  -1.176*** 
 (1.29)  (0.08) (1.38)  (3.57) 
ht_ICOST -4.906***  -6.784*** -5.237***  2.543*** 
 (6.75)  (8.25) (5.55)  (3.26) 
FX 0.120*** -0.063 0.185*** 0.064*** -0.176 -0.001 
 (4.75) (1.29) (5.19) (4.14) (1.50) (0.06) 
DISTANCE -1.016*** -1.144*** -1.426***    
 (4.63) (3.41) (3.74)    
TREND -0.057* -0.007 0.038 -0.077 0.025 0.071*** 
 (1.74) (0.23) (1.37) (1.09) (0.50) (2.72) 
Constant -72.378*** -42.288*** -17.652*** -45.941 -34.766** 33.114*** 
 (11.41) (9.39) (5.82) (1.46) (1.98) (3.13) 
Observations 500 262 238 500 262 238 
R-squared 0.70 0.61 0.52 0.90 0.92 0.96 
Fixed Effects    Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 





Table A1: Countries in Sample 
Argentina Austria* Bahrain Barbados Belgium* 
Belize Brazil Bulgaria Canada* Chile 
Colombia Costa Rica Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark* 
Dominican 
Republic 
Egypt El Salvador Finland* France* 
Germany* Greece* Haiti Hungary Iceland 
Indonesia Iran Ireland* Israel Italy*  
Jamaica Japan* Kazakhstan Korea, Rep. Luxembourg* 
Malaysia Morocco Netherlands* Norway* Peru 




Slovenia South Africa* Spain Sweden* Switzerland* 





* Designates "rich" country. 
 
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean StdDev. Min Max 
rsales 974 8.018266 3.127511 0 12.81306 
hm_DEPEND 974 -1.886473 .476284 -3.945959 -1.285129 
ht_DEPEND 974 -1.885472 .4848221 -3.945959 -1.285129 
hm_SS 974 5.60079 .9815657 .4990857 7.09223 
ht_SS 974 5.582027 1.004756 .4992171 7.033479 
hm_NSAVING 974 2.922749 .2383355 .8527774 3.67128 
ht_NSAVING 974 2.930462 .2388065 .8527774 3.67128 
hm_INVEST 974 2.978351 .2772368 1.420696 3.729301 
ht_INVEST 974 2.998218 .2710202 1.421551 3.729302 
hm_GDP 974 20.71473 2.116007 13.50381 22.85291 
ht_GDP 974 20.9542 1.823801 17.39531 22.85291 
hm_SKILL 974 9.729492 .6447428 6.849034 10.54315 
ht_SKILL 974 9.755236 .6202961 7.862764 10.34466 
hm_TCOST 974 -3.523585 .6381226 -5.390213 -2.623218 
ht_TCOST 974 -3.46925 .609518 -5.218287 -2.314134 
ht_ICOST 974 -4.105966 .2168483 -4.414816 -3.3889 
FX 974 .3088777 3.950176 -9.211701 22.28391 
DISTANCE 974 8.330199 .5415427 6.120297 9.226509 
TREND 974 10.84908 4.433686 3 18 
RICH 974 .486653 .5000786 0 1 
 
  
